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THE SIOUX WAR:

WHAT HAS BEEN DONE BY THE MINNESOTA
CAMPAIGN OF 1863:

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE DURING A DAKOTA
CAMPAIGN OF 1864.

WITH SOME GENERAL REMARKS UPON THE INDIAN POLICY,
PAST AND FUTURE, OF THE UNITED STATES.

BY JAMES W. TAYLOR.

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THE SIOUX WAR: PAST AND FUTURE.

I.

THE EXPEDITIONS OF GENERALS SIBLEY AND SULLY.

The plan of General Pope for the campaign of 1863, against the hostile Sioux Indians, and the manner in which it has been modified by events on the Missouri, may be thus stated:

1. General Sibley, with a force of 3,600 troops—1,000 of them cavalry—was to pursue a northwest course, crossing into Dakota Territory near Big Stone Lake, and thence, by the valley of the Shayenne river, to the vicinity of Devil's Lake.

2. General Sully, with a force nearly equal, but chiefly cavalry, was ordered to keep along the left or eastern bank of the Missouri river, and intercept all communications of the Isanti or Minnesota Sioux, and the Yanktonnais or Dakota Sioux, with the equally numerous bands of the Dakota nation west of the Missouri, who are known on the frontier as Tetons. General Sully's troops were to be supplied by steamers ascending the Missouri river, on which would be a sufficient

force of infantry for the protection of the vessels and their indispensable cargoes.

3. The retreat of the Indians, westward, being thus prevented, it was hoped that the Minnesota column, under General Sibley, would bring the Isanti and Yanktonnais Sioux to battle near the Minniwakan or Devil's Lake. The number of hostile warriors thus massed together east of the Missouri, was estimated in a communication to the St. Paul Press at 2,000: but General Sibley, Maj. Brown and others, estimated their number at 2,500. General Pope assumed the latter estimate to be most correct, as it proved, and organized the expedition under General Sibley on a scale adequate to cope with such a force, when placed in an advantageous position of defence.

4. While thus prepared for the contingency of a severe engagement, General Pope hardly expected it on American territory. He rather anticipated, if the American troops and trains were kept clear of ambushade, that the Indians would avoid a battle and seek safety from attack over the International line, espe-

cially as Little Crow had done everything possible to conciliate the authorities at Selkirk, and secure some kind of British protection. What should be done in such a case, was a grave question at the Head Quarters of the Department of the Northwest in April last, and was the subject of no little discussion at Washington and Quebec.

5. It became unnecessary to determine the point. The unprecedented drouth and low water in the Missouri river prevented the progress northward of Sully's expedition, which was confidently anticipated. General Pope had engaged vessels for the transportation of supplies, which, during the memory of the oldest fur-trader, had been accustomed to navigate the Upper Missouri to Fort Union: than which the Northern Light and Key City of the Galena and St. Paul line are no better adapted to the usual summer navigation of the Upper Mississippi: and, indeed, upon the rapid Missouri, the cockle-shell craft, with which the navigation of 1863 has made us familiar, are very seldom seen. But, all excuses aside, the fact was as just stated—the low water above Fort Randall prevented the advance of the steamers chartered to attend and supply General Sully's command: and it was not until after the middle of July, by the substitution of other and smaller craft, that the Dakota column was fairly in motion.

6. Of course, the Sioux camps were advised of the unexpected advantage. Their line of retreat was suddenly changed from the direction of Central British America, to a westward march across the Missouri, where, in the vicinity of the Yellowstone river and its tributaries, they could form an alliance, defensive and offensive, with the trans-Missouri Sioux, or the Teton.

7. Still, as we gather from General

Pope's dispatch to General Halleck, General Sully will occupy the left bank of the Missouri in force, effectually covering and protecting not only the Minnesota border, but the whole of Dakota Territory east of the Missouri river. By the terms of that dispatch General Pope assumes an obligation that no Sioux Indian shall recross the Missouri, except as prisoner of war, or *en route* to the reservation newly assigned to the tribe in the vicinity of Fort Randall.

8. Another portion of the General's programme may be modified by the unexpected turn of events. When it was anticipated that the Minnesota column would be advanced to the international boundary, or *beyond*, in pursuit of the enemy, the General had determined, after dealing with the Sioux, to divide his force at Pembina, bringing 1500 of the troops back to Fort Ripley through the Chippewa country; only halting in the vicinity of Red Lake river to assist in the consummation of the long deferred but vitally essential treaty for the cession of the Red River Valley, which he expected the Government, through its civil representatives, to be then prepared to negotiate. Perhaps General Sibley will yet cooperate with Senator Ramsey in this respect, by a detail of troops from the camp near Fort Abercrombie.

9. It has always been a favorite theory of frontier defense with General Pope that stockades for the repression of Indian outrage, should not be in the midst of settlements, but as far as practicable in advance of them. As early as 1849, in his well known report of exploration in Minnesota, these views were enforced: and in accordance therewith, he now regards Forts Ridgely and Abercrombie, as depots for the supply of more remote posts, which he would station (1) at Pembina Mountain, or the village of St.

Joseph; (2) perhaps near Devil's Lake, certainly at the second crossing of the Slay-cum; (3) at some convenient point in the Valley of the James west of Big Stone Lake; and (4) at Fort Pierre on the Missouri river. I have no doubt, that, if necessary to the object, which he has recently and publicly announced to the War Department—namely, the removal of Indian enemies and hostilities beyond the Missouri—General Pope will find or make a way to the entire security of the frontiers of settlement, both in the State of Minnesota and the Territory of Dakota.

—I have thus presented a summary of the views with which the military movements against the Sioux were projected for the campaign of 1863. Its object was the protection of Minnesota—it may properly be called a Minnesota campaign. As such, if General Sully can be relied upon to occupy and permanently hold the left bank of the Missouri from Fort Clark to Fort Randall, it will be successful. Every one, having had experience of travel upon the Plains, must regard the march of Gen. Sibley's column as a wonder of vigilance and circumspection, and with the results of the forced march west of Camp Atkinson the citizens of Minnesota have no just cause of complaint; *always, however, on one vital condition, that the campaign is not held by the commanding general or his military superiors to be terminated!*

The Dakota War is simply transferred to the west bank of the Missouri river. It is only rolled further to the West. Our settlements here in Minnesota are secure or will be made secure by the events and arrangements of the next sixty days, but is this all? Quite otherwise. The Sioux War is yet flagrant. Sully and Sibley have massed 5,000 warriors together—Isantia, Yanetons, Yanetonnais

and Tetons—upon the plains surrounding the Dakota citadel of strength—the Black Hills, situated only 120 miles west of Fort Pierre: and this war will never end, until that savage mass, with perhaps a thousand Crow warriors in alliance with them, are effectually subdued—forced into abject submission.

I have yet to learn that the Military Department of the Northwest is bounded west by the channel of the Missouri. Its limit is only the continental divide of the Rocky Mountains. The officer in command is responsible to the people of the Northwest for the pacification of the whole interval from Minnesota to the Mountains. The subjugation of the Dakota Nation, now universally hostile, is the only termination of this War, which will not be a criminal waste of the energy and resources of the Government.

Further considerations in support of a Dakota campaign adequate to secure the results of the Minnesota campaign now closing, will be presented, with editorial permission, in subsequent articles.

II.

THE SITUATION, NUMBERS AND DISPOSITION OF THE DAKOTA NATION.

Lieut. G. K. Warren, Topographical Engineer, was attached to the staff of Brigadier General W. S. Harney, commanding the Sioux Expedition of 1855-6. His observations, while thus employed, have been published by the United States Senate in a document entitled "Reconnoissances in the Dakota Country." Lieut. Warren afterwards conducted an expedition "to ascertain the best route for continuing the military road between Fort Snelling and the mouth of the Big Sioux to Fort Laramie and the South Pass, by way of the Loup Fork of the Platte River; to explore the Black Hills, about the sources of the Sheyenne and Little Missouri

rivers: and to examine the Niobrara or l'Eau qui Court river, for the purpose of ascertaining its character and resources and the practicability of locating a road along it, leading from the Missouri river to the South Pass, or from Fort Randall to Fort Laramie."

The instructions of the War Office to the foregoing effect bore the date of May 6, 1857, and during the summer and autumn of that year, were carried into execution. The Report of Lieut. Warren, narrating the results of his exploration, is printed in Executive Documents for 1858-9, Volumes 2 and 3. He presented therewith, which has been published by Congress, a "military map of Nebraska and Dakota," designed to represent "all the region occupied by the Dakota or Sioux Indians, and the best routes by which to approach and traverse it, and along which to conduct military operations to the best advantage." It is on a scale of 1 to 1,250,000, and embraces all the country from the 90th to the 106th meridian, between the 28th and 50th parallels. In its northeast corner is the Lake of the Woods, in the southeast Fort Leavenworth, in the southwest Pike's Peak, and in the northwest the junction of Milk river with the Missouri.

The instructions of the Government and the outlines of Lieut. Warren's map, alike indicate the proximate limits of the Dakota country—of that immense interior district from which the Sioux Indians exclude all other tribes. The total area may be estimated at 200,000 square miles, or five times the size of Ohio, extending, prior to the Sioux campaign of 1863, from the channel of the Red River of the North and the sources of the Minnesota river (the average longitude of 96° west of Greenwich) on the east, to the Black Hills on the west, and from the forks of the Platte on the south to Min-

niwakan or Devil's Lake on the north. These limits constitute nearly the outlines, given above, of Warren's military map of Nebraska and Dakota Territories.

I propose, in the present paper, to repeat the observations of Lieut. Warren as recorded in 1857, upon the number and disposition of the Sioux Indians, with his speculations upon the probability and nature of a Sioux war.

There is no longer any dispute of Lieut. Warren's accuracy in estimating the total Sioux population at 30,000 or 6,000 warriors. Omitting the minor subdivisions of bands, they may be classified as (1) *Isanties*, or the four Minnesota bands who were first engaged in the massacre of August, 1862; (2) *Yanktons*, formerly at the mouth of the Big Sioux, and between that stream and the Missouri river, as high up as Fort Lookout and on the opposite side of the Missouri; (3) *Yanktonnais*, who ranged (whether they now range, is the whole question of the success or failure of Sibley's expedition) between James river and the Missouri as high north as Devil's Lake; and (4) *Tetons*, who are supposed to constitute more than one-half of the Dakota nation, living on the western side of the Missouri, and extending west to the dividing ridge between the Little Missouri and Powder rivers, and thence south on a line near the 106th meridian. Estimating eight inmates to a lodge, and one-fifth of the whole population to be warriors, Lieut. Warren furnished the following summary:

	Lodges.	Inmates.	Warriors.
Isanties, -	775	6,200	1,240
Yanktons, -	360	2,880	576
Yanktonnais, -	800	6,400	1,280
Tetons, -	1,540	14,720	2,962
	3,775	30,200	6,058

Of all the aborigines on this continent

the Dakotas have probably undergone the least material diminution of number, since their discovery by the whites. Notwithstanding the ravages of small pox and cholera, it is the opinion of some that they are increasing in numbers rather than diminishing.

Lieut. Warren was far from depreciating their military strength. "They are independent, warlike, and powerful. * * * Could they be made to feel more confidence in their own powers they would be most formidable warriors. In single combat on horseback, they have no superiors, a skill acquired by constant practice with their bows and arrows and lances, with which they succeed in killing their game at full speed. The rapidity with which they shoot their arrows, and the accuracy of their aim, rivals that of a practised hand with the revolver."

The campaign of General Harney in 1855-6, for the chastisement of the most southern of the Teton bands, the Brules and Okandandas, although terminating with a sanguinary and decisive victory, by no means abated the arrogance or hostility of the main body of the trans-Missouri Sioux. Like the Yanktonnais of the plains south of Devil's Lake, they were under no restraints by treaty, and their normal condition may be described as hostile. A Teton chief told Lieut. Warren, that they had a grand council in the summer of 1857, on the North Fork of the Shayanme (a western tributary of the Missouri) and that their hearts felt strong at seeing how numerous they were; and that if they went to war again, they would not yield so easy as they did in 1856. At that council they solemnly pledged to each other not to permit farther encroachments from the whites and the chief boasted and fully believed that they were able to whip all the white men. Another Teton leader gave notice that

they would not suffer the Government to drive or locate the Yankton or Yanktonnais bands across the Missouri—angrily denouncing war against the whites in such a case.

Lieut. Warren has now become Major General Warren, having been raised to that high rank, as an acknowledgment of eminent services in the battle of Gettysburg, as Brigadier General and Chief of Topographical Engineers. His views of a Dakota War—its inevitable approach, and how it should be conducted with the Missouri river established as a base of operations—will now be recognized at Washington, as entitled to the highest consideration. I feel warranted, therefore, in repeating the following paragraphs from his report of 1875-9:

"There are so many movable causes at work (he says) to produce a war with the Dakotas before many years, that I regard the greatest fruit of the explorations I have conducted to be the knowledge of the proper routes by which to invade their country and conquer them.

"The Black Hills—the great point in their territory at which to strike all the Teton Dakotas, against the Brules and Okandandas. Here they concentrate their forces, and here I believe they winter in great numbers. In the event of another outbreak, a point should be established at the mouth of the Shayanme, on the north side, from which expeditions could simultaneously with troops from Fort Laramie. From both of these points various routes could move with ease, and expeditions could be sent to troops in the field. These expeditions would not be so likely to be on a hostile, where the superiority of the weapons of civilized warfare would secure a victory for us. They will not, I think, permit the possession of the corner of these hills without obtaining a determined resistance. I have therefore considered the necessity of placing a good battery and to connect another line will be found in this region is in every way practicable. In this event it might become necessary to establish a temporary post above the Thompson, and a

most suitable and effective location is to be found near Long Lake, on the Missouri.

"Those who may take refuge in the ravines and fastnesses along the Niobrara, or in the sand hills, could be operated against from Forts Randall, Kearney and Laramie. Should the Isanties and Ihanktowans be hostile at the same time as the Titonwans, they should be operated against from Fort Ridgely.

It will be perceived that in this plan I have considered a war with all the Dakotas to be on our hands, which at no distant day is probable, and that there will be required a number of columns and a very large force to successfully operate over so much country. These columns need not to exceed in any case a strength of 400 men, and these should be subdivided so as to beat up the country as much as possible, and endeavor to draw the Indians into an engagement where they may have some hope of success. With proper troops and commanders we need not even then fear the result.

"The movement of large compact columns is necessarily slow, and can easily be avoided, which the least military skill teaches the Indians to do. The war once begun should not be stopped till they are effectually humbled and made to feel the full power and force of the government, which is a thing in which the northern Dakotas are entirely wanting.

"I believe a vigorous course of action would be quite as humane as any other, and much more economical and effectual in the end. With proper arrangements the Assinibolins and Crows and Pawnees could be made most useful allies in a war with the northern Dakotas. I see no reason why they should not be employed against each other, and thus spare the lives of the whites."

It will be seen that Lieut. Warren dismissed the contingency of an Indian War upon the Minnesota border, with a single sentence—"Should the Isanties and Yanktons be hostile at the same time with the Tetons, they should be operated against from Fort Ridgely." It is now historical, that the first outbreak of a Dakota War was among the annuity or Minnesota Sioux; and we enter upon its second year, with the hope (can we say the expectation?)

that the combined operations of 60 American troops under Generals Sibley and Sully, have pushed 2500 Indian warriors permanently over the Missouri river—violently intruding them upon the buffalo hunting grounds of the Teton Sioux who have never been at peace with the United States, unless the submission of the Brules and Okandandas to the victorious regulars under Gen. Harney can be called a peace. What will be the consequence? Will General Pope, if interrogated from the War Department, make any other answer, than to represent the inevitable necessity of organizing a campaign against 5000 hostile savages west of the Missouri, unless the results of his military operations during 1863 are to be wantonly thrown away? To suppose otherwise would be an unwarrantable reflection upon his knowledge of the situation and of his military judgment in regard to late events.

III.

GENERAL HOSTILITY OF THE SIOUX IN 1863.

Is this doubted? If Lieut. Warren, in 1857, was so impressed with the hostile disposition of the Tetons, as to assign to those Indians of the Plains the initiative of an inevitable Dakota war, surely they would be prompt to follow the fiery signal from the east, hurried into their lodges by the hitherto peaceful Isanties. That extraordinary organization, the Soldier's Lodge, is not confined to the savages of the Minnesota border. A community of language, tradition, blood, and religious incantation, binds indissolubly the Sioux villages from the shores of the Minniwakan to the sources of the Niobrara. Their chiefs are but waifs on the fierce democracy of the tribe. The absence of Little Crow, and the universal belief in the Sioux camps that he was killed, did

not check for an instant their warlike fanaticism. The Dakota chiefs must share and follow the inspiration of the scalp dance, or be deposed by the warriors. It would be interesting to know, if the information was possible, how soon, after the August massacre of 1862, its bloody details were shouted with exultation in the Teton encampments within the valleys of the Black Hills—ten degrees of longitude away from the bloody margins of the Minnesota lakes. From that instant the Teton was on the war-path.

I am informed by Col. W. R. Marshall that Gen. Sibley is satisfied of the participation of Teton warriors in the late battles on the Missouri, particularly that of Stony Lake. Among the articles abandoned were Teton tent poles, identified by Major Brown as made from spruce, which only grows in the Black Hills. A Teton was captured, who admitted that his tribe were engaged. So far as the Indian force exceeded 2,000, it was doubtless composed of these allies from beyond the Missouri. Their presence is an assurance, to us as well as to the Indians, that if Sully forces the enemy to continue their retreat towards the country of the Tetons, the latter will make common cause with the Minnesota bands against the whites.

The newspapers record that during the present summer fur-trading steamers descending the Missouri have been attacked by Sioux Indians. While the bulk of Indians in these ambuscades have been Sioux, inhabiting the left bank of the Missouri; yet there is little doubt that the Tetons have also been engaged.

The late attempt to destroy the Pawnee Agency and murder the Indians and whites there entrenched, was unquestionably the work of those identical bands of Sioux—Brules, Okandandas and others

—who were punished so severely in 1856 by Gen. Harney at the battle of Blue Water. The savages have evidently forgotten the lesson of that expedition; and, if so, will the results of our Minnesota campaign be more efficacious? Certainly not, unless vigorously followed.

All the information of the Indian Bureau, so far as it transpires from Washington, concurs with the argument *a priori* of Lieutenant Warren, and the facts of recent occurrence just detailed, that the Pacification of the Northwest frontier imperatively demands a vigorous military administration, offensive and defensive, upon the Missouri river and beyond.

IV.

THE NAVIGATION OF THE MISSOURI RIVER —SETTLEMENTS OF EASTERN IDAHO— A NEW TERRITORY OF UPSAROKA.

The Indians, who, in August, 1862, were guilty of the Minnesota massacre, one year afterwards, were in ambuscade upon the Missouri river, thence attacking and murdering, after a desperate conflict, a party of miners, about thirty in number, who were returning from the gold fields of the Upper Missouri. The *St. Paul Press* of September 5 gives the painful rumor, brought over the intervening distance of five hundred miles by the half-breed hunters, who appear to have the freedom of the Sioux camp, and have been frequently consulted by General Sibley. The scene of the late massacre on the Missouri was near the localities of the recent engagements with the Sioux by the Minnesota troops—in latitude 46° 20' min.

The Sioux War removed from the Minnesota river and the Red River of the North to the banks of the Missouri, perhaps west of that river!—this is all which

the most sanguine will claim as the result of the campaign of 1863. But to accomplish even that result General Sully must ascend the left bank of the Missouri with his column, overtaking and striking the Sioux assassins, who fled from Sibley and fell upon the unfortunate party of miners. We have assurances that such a degree of activity and success may be expected from General Sully.*

I can imagine an Eastern journalist, perhaps so far interested as to consult a map, and inquiring—"How came a party of thirty miners afloat on the Missouri in the heart of yonder wilderness, and exposed so hopelessly to Indian attack?" I propose to answer the question.

This party of miners were not on their way from "Salmon river," which is a tributary of the Columbia river, rising and flowing down the Pacific slope of the Rocky Mountains. They were from the mountain valleys which feed the tributaries of the Missouri river—far east of the Salmon river region—from a district of

the Eastern Piedmont of the Rocky Mountains, of which the average longitude is 111 degrees, and the average latitude is 45 degrees.

The Bannock City mines, as they are called, were first discovered in September, 1862, upon Grasshopper creek, of Wisdom river, of Jefferson river—the latter being one of three streams which form the Missouri, one hundred and fifty miles above its Great Falls. While the principal population at Bannock City, during the first sixty days, consisted of one hundred Minnesotians, who had crossed the plains from St Paul, yet they were soon outnumbered by crowds of immigrants from the State of Oregon, and the territories of Washington, Colorado and Utah—one column from the west, and another from the south. Of these, full half scattered to different points, east and northeast. Another small tributary of the Jefferson Fork—the Stinking Water—is a great centre of mining excitement. A prospecting party had reached the Yellowstone and Powder rivers, reporting very rich deposits of gold. "All these discoveries," as Mr. N. P. Langford of Bannock City, late of St. Paul, writes, "are within the belt between latitude 44 deg. 30 min. and 46 deg. 30 min., or about 150 statute miles in width, and extending from the summit of the Rocky mountains to the Big Horn river, (longitude 107 deg. west of Greenwich,) and even as far east as the Black hills." In July, 1863, the mining population upon the headwaters of the Missouri was five thousand, and with the excitement pervading Utah and Colorado will probably reach ten thousand before winter. Towns are already projected at Fort Benton; the limit of steamboat navigation on the Missouri; at the junction of the Big Horn and Yellowstone rivers; and at the

* I had supposed, when the first of these pages passed the press, that Sully's expedition on the Missouri river, was dependent for supplies and transportation upon the steamers sent up for his use. I am informed, that this was by no means the case. The steamers carried large supplies for his use, and were furnished each with a guard of two companies of infantry and two pieces of artillery. They were to make their way as rapidly as possible up the Missouri as *movable depots* of supplies for Sully. Aside from these, he had wagons enough to transport seventy-five days' rations for his command, and it was neither intended or expected that he should keep with his boats or delay on that account his movement towards Devil's Lake to co-operate with Sibley. The boats are designed to enable him to replenish his supplies after returning to the Missouri. His instructions extended to the middle of November: and General Peep's plan and wish is that General Sully's command should be kept on the Upper Missouri during the winter of 1863-4, to cover Minnesota and Dakota, and in the early spring of 1864, to take the field with a heavy cavalry force and complete the work west of the river.

meeting of the Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin forks of the Missouri—all offshoots from Bannock City, which has hitherto had the advantage of being the entrepot of the immigration from the west and south. Thus are the movements of population reversed—instead of being exclusively from east to west as formerly.

Newspapers and private letters from Denver City admit that the reports from Eastern Idaho are not only stimulating a considerable migration from Colorado, but that the Overland Emigration by the route of the Platte is largely diverted to these Northern mines. It may now be asserted with confidence that a populous community will soon, within the latitudes of the State of Minnesota and the Territory of Dakota, occupy the valleys of the innumerable streams, which unite to form the navigable channels of the Missouri and Yellowstone rivers.

The victims of the late Sioux massacre on the Missouri, were representatives of the new community, the growth of a single year, which within ten years will take rank as a Mountain State. How long will Government be unable to protect the lives of its citizens on such a great natural highway as the Missouri?

At the next session of Congress appeals from the adventurous men, who are following in the footsteps of Lewis and Clark—the pioneer explorers of this interesting region—will be heard at Washington. Already, through the journals of St. Louis and St. Paul, we have intimations of the reasonable demands which will be presented to the consideration of Congress and the country. Cannot the ten thousand citizens, who are guiding the star of American Empire eastward from the Rocky Mountains, rely with confidence upon the adoption of the following policy by the executive and legis-

lative departments of the Federal Government?

1. *A Territorial Government.*—Idaho, the creation of the last Congress, is organized and administered exclusively in the interest of the western slope of the mountains—the basin of the Columbia. Its capital, I understand, is located at Lewiston, not far from Wallawalla. The officials were nominated on the recommendation of the Oregon and Washington delegations. But here is a new community—hundreds of miles to the eastward, facing to the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico; and Nature clearly indicates a boundary of division, which shall follow the parting of the waters along the summits of the Rocky Mountains. Organize the Eastern Piedmont into a new territory—the Territory of Upsaroka: and Idaho on the west will still have an area of 120,000 square miles, equal to three Ohios. Upsaroka, or the Crow country, bounded east on longitude 104° or the west boundary of Dakota, would be possessed of an equal area.

2. *Protection from the Crow Indians.*—Of course, it is not surprising, that this sudden irruption of thousands of whites should disturb the Indian occupants. The Crows, all accounts unite, are a warlike and superior body of Indians—numbering about one thousand warriors, and hitherto friendly, so much so that Lieut. Warren in 1879 enumerated them as reliable allies in the war which he anticipated with the Sioux. But 1863 has witnessed and produced another state of things. The Crow chiefs anticipate nothing else than another Pike's Peak or Colorado excitement, with its attendant population, over the whole extent of their hunting grounds, and have already attacked parties of exploration. The settlers, in turn, will ask for troops, stockades, military roads: As Pope's plan

of campaign is developed beyond the Missouri, even to the gulches of the Black Hills, that officer may expect, and has unquestionably fully considered the contingency, that requisitions will reach him from the foot of the Mountains.

3. *A Thorough Dakota Campaign.*—To the mountaineers of Idaho East, or Upsaroka, this has now become as great a necessity, as to the citizens of Dakota. The navigation of the Yellow Stone and Upper Missouri, meeting at Fort Union, and thence stretching to St. Louis, with the perfect security of overland roads from Minnesota, are directly involved in General Pope's plan for the present and next ensuing campaigns against the Sioux Indians. These savages block the way to the whole system of Northwestern development. Of course, the obstacle cannot be suffered to remain; but in order to remove it effectually, our military and civil leaders must not organize their future policy on narrow and insufficient foundations. The military necessity is as palpable at the remotest spring of the Missouri as at the western sources of the Minnesota: and Indian pacification must be thorough in all portions, however remote, of the Department of the Northwest.*

*For further particulars of the Crow country, which I call Upsaroka, from the Indian name of the Crows, I refer to a report of explorations by Captain W. F. Reynolds, U. S. Topographical Engineers, during the years 1839-40, the publication of which at Washington has been interrupted, but may be expected soon. Washington Irving's "Adventures of Captain Bonneville, U. S. A., in the Rocky Mountains," affords a pleasing sketch of the Crow country, especially the navigation of the Big Horn and Yellowstone rivers. Lewis and Clark's invaluable Narrative, and some portions of Stevens' Railway Exploration, can be consulted with interest. The letters of James Fergus, N. P. Langford, and other Minnesotians, now in the Bannock mines, which have appeared, and may still be expected in the

V.

THE BLACK HILLS OF DAKOTA TERRITORY—
THEIR INEVITABLE COLONIZATION—
THE STRATEGIC POINT OF A DAKOTA CAMPAIGN.

All the white population of the Territory of Dakota, and many restless sojourners on the frontiers of Minnesota and Iowa have been led, by facts and fancy, to believe that the Black Hills, or more properly mountains, situated on the 44th parallel and between the 103d and 105th meridians, are rich in gold and silver, as well as coal, iron, and pine forests. Hence, the exploration and occupation of the Black Hills, is regarded, in the Missouri settlements north of Sioux City, to be vital to their growth and prosperity. With a rich mineral field, the most eastern outlier of the Rocky Mountains, accessible at a distance of 120 miles from the navigable channel of the Missouri, and that distance reduced by ascending the Shyenne river, the Dakota settlers expect a degree of encouragement to agriculture in the converging valleys of the Big Sioux, the James and the Missouri, which will soon give them the population and resources requisite for their organization as a State; but otherwise they must unavoidably languish as a feeble and isolated territory.

On the other hand, the Black Hills, with their sheltered and game-stocked valleys, is the citadel of the Teton Sioux—cherished as the apple of his eye. "The Black Hills," to repeat Lieut. Warren, "is the great point in their ter-

St. Paul newspapers, indicate a milder climate than in the same latitudes of Minnesota and Dakota—a wonderful abundance of wild animals, and much greater capacity for agriculture than is observed of the Great Plains which adjoin on the east; while the most auriferous region of the continent, there is reason to think, is about to be revealed in directions east, northeast, and north of Fremont's Peak and the Wind River chain of mountains.

ritory at which to strike the Teton Dakotas, where they can assemble their largest force and would make a stand." In 1857 they turned Lieut. W.'s party back from the vicinity of Inyan Kara, the highest and most central peak of the mountains, stating that they had already given up all the country to the whites they could spare, and the Black Hills must be left wholly to themselves.

The area occupied by the Black Hills, as delineated on Warren's Map, is 6,000 square miles, about the size of Connecticut. Their bases are elevated from 2,500 feet to 3,500 feet and the highest peaks are about 6,700 feet above the ocean level. The whole geological range of rocks, from the granite and metamorphosed azoic to the cretaceous formation of the surrounding plains, are developed by the upheaval of the mountain mass. Thus, at the junction of the silurian rocks, gold becomes accessible and the carboniferous strata bring coal measures within reach. I present some extracts from Lieutenant Warren's Report:

* * * "The Inyan Kara Peak is basaltic * * * More recent volcanic action is visible at Bear's Peak. * * * The highest mountain masses, such as Harvey's Peak, on the east side, are all granite, the rocks, as seen at a distance, appearing to be coarse granite or gneiss standing in layers and slabs, indicating a vertical stratification. They derive their name from being covered with pine, whose dark green gives them a black appearance.

"In these mountain formations are to be found beautiful flowing streams and small rich valleys covered over with fine grass for hay, and susceptible of fertilization by means of irrigation. Fine timber for fuel and lumber, limestone and good stone for building purposes, are here abundant. Gold has been found in valuable quantities, and without doubt the more common and useful minerals will be discovered when more minute examinations are made."

Dr. F. V. Hayden, the Geologist and

Naturalist of the Expedition, confirms the foregoing description. Speaking of the geological discoveries, he says:

"Passing over the granite and azoic rocks, we find that the Potsdam sandstone, or the lowest member of the silurian period, is quite well developed in the Black Hills. It is there brought to the surface by the upheaval of the igneous rocks, and forms a narrow belt around the most elevated portions of the mountains. This formation, so much well known and studied in many parts of the United States, had not been recognized in the region of the Rocky Mountains, prior to Lieut. and Warren's expedition during the summer of 1857. * * * A large collection of fossils was secured from the carboniferous group in the Black Hills."

Dr. Hayden, in a general sketch of the Botany of Nebraska and Dakota, observes:

"After passing above latitude 43 deg., the soil becomes less fertile, climate much drier, and vegetation less luxuriant. The whole country, though well adapted for the purposes of pasturage, is not well suited for agriculture, except in comparatively few localities. There is very little timber but that which skirts the streams, and consists for the most part of cottonwood, elm, ash and boxwood. Reaching the mountains, as the Bear's Paw, Snowy, Grouse, Black Hills, or Laramie Hills, an inexhaustible supply of pine timber is found, with many other varieties of trees common to the northern regions. The numerous broad valleys in the Black Hills possess a very fertile soil and abound in springs of pure water, and the timber does not be far distant when this region, as well as the country around Fort Laramie, will be settled by a thriving population, and the vast forests of pine rendered serviceable to the wants of man.

"That there is a marked improvement in the character of the country, as we approach the mountains, has already been noticed in published reports. The valley of the Yellowstone river, after passing the mouth of the Big Horn, is spoken of by both traders and Indians, as quite fertile, abounding with excellent timber, fine clear springs of water, and a luxuriant vegetation. The Crows, who now possess this region, regard it as the finest

country in the world. The immense beds of gypsum, of the Jurassic formation, along the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains, some of which are twenty feet in thickness, would furnish an inexhaustible supply of that excellent fertilizer."

In the face of these physical facts, the people of the Territory of Dakota have a right to the protection of the Government, in their advance upon the Black Hills. They are preparing to hold, occupy and possess them.

With the impulse now given to gold discovery in the mountains, far to the west, at the sources of the Missouri and Yellowstone, who expects that the Half Way Station, inclosed within the north and south forks of the Shyenne river, and not a week's journey from Fort Pierre and Missouri river steamers, in latitude 45°, will be suffered to remain a solitude—a preserve of game for Sioux Indians? Even if there were no proofs of gold, silver, iron and copper (specimens of the latter have reached the Dakota settlements this summer) in the gulches of the Black Hills, the demand for pine timber in the valley of the lower Missouri will send armed parties into the forests which darken the flanks of the mountains. Give Dakota the supply of timber to the towns and plains below, and a greater accumulation of wealth—a greater stimulant of agriculture and commerce, are assured to the pioneers of that territory than if the Black Hills prove as auriferous as California: while, if both elements of sudden and progressive prosperity are combined, the admission of Dakota as a State will be contemporaneous with the recognition of Nebraska and Colorado, as members of the Union.

Thus will protection to the colonization of the Black Hills become an unavoidable military necessity during a Dakota campaign of 1864.

VI.

THE INDIAN POLICY, PAST AND FUTURE,
OF THE UNITED STATES.

Prior to 1850, the Government of the United States would have cheerfully surrendered the Great Plains west of the 100th meridian of longitude and the whole Rocky Mountain region to the crest of the Sierra Nevada of California and the Cascade Range of Oregon, for the sole and exclusive occupation of Indians and Fur Traders. The Gold Discovery of California, now so immensely extended in American Territory, has worked (rather *is working*) a revolution of policy. Our production of gold and silver, present and prospective, is an addition to the national wealth, more than adequate to support the national credit in the suppression of the most formidable rebellion of history: and in the presence of such a great physical and financial fact, the "American Desert" will speedily be organized into great central States, with populations mainly engrossed by Mining and Grazing; while the internal commerce of the Agricultural States of the Mississippi and Pacific coasts, with the diverse industries and societies of the Great Interior Plains and Mountains, is destined to exceed the boldest calculation.

A new development of American civilization—one not anticipated by the generation of 1825-50—is progressing with a velocity vastly increased over the movements of agricultural population from the Atlantic to the Mississippi Valley. Within the summer of 1863, as we have remarked in Idaho, its current is rushing through the mountain valleys, *from west to east*, in addition to the normal and traditional advance towards the setting sun.

What a transformation of the wilderness, which Fremont, unconscious of the gleaming treasures under his feet, was

accustomed to characterize as Asiatic in sterility as well as scenery! In 1853 Senator Chase of Ohio proposes the appropriation of \$150,000, as the initiative of railway exploration across the continent—in 1863 the Secretary of the Treasury has only to mature the application of a revenue system to the gold product of our American Andes, to carry the interest account upon two thousand millions of Union war debt. In the days of Jackson, sagacious politicians would have given a quit-claim of all our Western pampas, with their sky-piercing sierras, in exchange for the removal of the Indians from States east of the Mississippi river—assigning reservations west of Missouri and Arkansas, on a scale as reckless as the charters of Charles II, which, fronting on the margins of the Atlantic, were vaguely extended inland “to the South Sea”; and now, next in order to the suppression of the Southern Rebellion, every thoughtful observer places the duty of the Government to chastise and subdue the Indian barbarians of our exposed territories, not only as a measure of humanity to the emigrant and settler, but as indispensable to the internal strength and wealth of the nation.

A Roman, a Spanish, an English policy—any other policy than that hitherto pursued by the United States—is forced by events upon the Government, towards the nomadic and savage tribes, which obstruct by robbery and murder our overland routes between the Mississippi and the Pacific States. The facts cursorily presented in these papers show, how, within a single year, this public necessity has enlarged and intensified along that Northern line between the Lakes and the Upper Mississippi on the east, and the Columbia River and Puget's Sound on the west, which early enlisted the interest of Jefferson, and has since been so fully

vindicated as an inevitable highway of the Future. I have shown how “nations are born in a day,” within our Minnesota latitudes, as the *auri sacra fames* surges into the mountain valleys, whose springs feed the basins of opposite oceans: and I have forborne, in the presence of the great continental and national interests, which are involved in the general repression of Indian hostilities, to enlarge upon the argument which might be reiterated in behalf of Minnesota. So far as the present appeal is local in its tenor, let it chiefly refer to our fellow-citizens—many of them old neighbors and friends—who are pioneers of American colonization upon the upper channel of the Missouri, and at the sources of the Columbia and Mississippi. Whatever the nation may now do to secure the safety and aid the exertions of those remote settlements, will be repaid ten-fold, in less than a decade of years, by their development and contributions as States of the American Union.

In this connection, I am justified in repeating the language of Hon. Alex. Ramsey, Senator from Minnesota, when recently addressed upon the subject of a Pacific Railway: “The conclusion seems to me irresistible,” he says in a letter to the New York firm of Samuel Hallet & Co., “that, whereas seven railroads are indispensable to our communications with the Atlantic Ocean, the national destiny will soon require more than one highway from the Mississippi to the Pacific.” And again: “So far from regarding a Pacific Railway on the latitude of St. Louis and San Francisco as premature, I anticipate, with the restoration of peace, that the Gulf States will revive the measure of a railroad from New Orleans and Vicksburgh to the Gulf of California, while the Northern States upon

the coast of the Great Lakes, will urge a similar communication between Minnesota and Oregon." Senator Doolittle, of Wisconsin, is already identified with such a proposition for the survey and location of an eligible railroad line from Lake Superior to Puget's Sound: and I anticipate that the kindred proposition in the interest of the Gulf States only awaits their reconstruction as loyal States, to be revived at Washington with the acclamations of citizens of all sections.

I feel warranted, therefore, on manifest grounds of American Destiny, as well as from my stand-point as a citizen of Minnesota, in respectfully submitting the following brief memorial to the national authorities, executive and legislative:

1. For a vigorous prosecution of the Sioux war until settlers and emigrants in all portions of the national territory between Minnesota and the Rocky Mountains, are effectually protected:

2. That the Sioux Indians be forced into a treaty, opening the Black Hills to the people of Dakota:

3. That Noble's wagon road from Fort Ridgely to the Missouri river, be continued from Fort Pierre, by the val-


ley of the ~~Shoemore~~ and the north slope of the Black Hills, through the Crow country and Bannock City to the Big Hole Pass of the Rocky Mountains, there connecting with Mullen's military road from Fort Benton to Wallawalla:

4. That Senator Doolittle's bill for the location and encouragement of a North Pacific Railroad, be passed:

5. That the Eastern flank of the mountains be separated from the Territory of Idaho, and organized into a new territory to be called Upsaroka or Jefferson:

6. That a military post be immediately established at the head of steamboat navigation on the Yellowstone river, for the protection of the mining settlements on the sources of the Missouri and Yellowstone:

7. And, with the auspicious termination of the War for the Union, that such inducements be presented by Congress, for the military colonization of the Mountain Districts by our soldiery, as will strengthen the arm of government in those remote States, establish order and security, and render their boundless mineral wealth tributary, in just and equal measure, to the national revenue.



THE SIOUX WAR:

WHAT HAS BEEN DONE BY THE MINNESOTA
CAMPAIGN OF 1863:

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE DURING A DAKOTA
CAMPAIGN OF 1864.



